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Missive Retaliation

Charles Burton Marshall

Thoughts on Economic Growth

William R. Allen *Edwin L. Dale, Jr.*

Sokolsky, Meet Feiffer

Susan M. Black

Resuming Negotiations

Hans J. Morgenthau

June 6, 1960, 25 cents

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Who's On First?

★ With the Summit over, the Foreign Relations Committee investigating the U-2 matter, the campaign getting hot, what effect has it all had on the Presidential candidates?

At home: Eisenhower made a strong case against the Soviet, left his own playing of the U-2 incident fogged over. One good thing: Khrushchev has taken a relatively mild line and Eisenhower has wisely said "we must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders." Unfortunately he has produced the old Eisenhower tranquilizers which are likely to destroy the warning of the whole incident.

As for politics as a whole, there was initial danger that those who idolize Eisenhower would recoil from the Summit fiasco with the declaration that no more negotiations should take place and retreat to isolationism. This was the reaction of the extreme Old Guard wing and various Republican papers. Oddly enough it also found vent in the Democratic Advisory Council's criticism of Eisenhower for having gone to the Summit at all (although many more Democrats originally attacked Eisenhower for reluctance in going). Fortunately confused events do not seem to be going along this way.

Most important immediate development was the brick Adlai Stevenson threw into the plate glass window. People have called Adlai Stevenson indecisive (and, alas, we have sometimes agreed with them), but this was an act of towering decision. Until Stevenson spoke it had looked as though the whole handling of the U-2 affair would be disgracefully wrapped away in the cotton wool of "national harmony and unity." We don't know what got into Adlai; in some ways it wasn't like him . . . we thought it wonderful.

So that brings us down to the venomous reaction of the Republicans to Stevenson. (We came through Chicago last week and really the contortions of the *Chicago Tribune* are terrible to behold! —the old lady is simply hopping up and down in rage.) On the Senate floor Senator Hugh Scott (R, Penna.), former GOP national chairman (who would like to be a Vice Presidential candidate), tossed the word "appeasers" on the beige carpet, directed at Stevenson and Senator Kennedy.

Stuart Symington countered this rather aptly, we thought, by deploring the hateful charge but remarking blandly that he got "consolation from the source from which it came." Later in the afternoon a breath-taking confrontation followed, a kind of chilly Wild West thriller, when young killer Kennedy stalked on the floor and demanded an explanation from Scott. It was like waiting for the draw in a Hollywood Western: Scott mumbling answers and Kennedy asking cool questions. Scott, who defied club rules (1) in making the charge, and (2) in making it in the absence of the man he attacked, finally gave a kind of grudging retraction which Kennedy publicly proclaimed an "apology." He walked off, as cool as ever. An interesting young man.

How Does the Crowd Feel?

★ So now we come to our *dramatis personnae*. How have events affected each one?

Eisenhower: Those who idolize him, idolize him. A lot of others begin to say "he's a fine fellow but let's be thankful this is his last year."

Nixon: No immediate change; he'll switch from the "I can get along with K" to "I can be tough with K" without a quiver. But the awkward U-2 dance caught him off balance, too. In the long run Nixon's big "peace" issue has been damaged.

Rockefeller: His political timing is execrable. He issued a good statement supporting a Senate inquiry, but why had he bowed out of the Presidential race in December? His sudden statement now that he will accept a draft seems rather silly. However, it probably means that the GOP convention won't be so dull. (We have a hunch if Rocky goes to the convention he will be tagged for Vice President.)

Stevenson: Most pundits here think he threw his brick a week too soon; maybe . . . But, oh, what a nice brick, what a splendid gesture! He led the way and Senators Kennedy, Symington, yes, and even to a degree, Majority Leader Johnson, followed.

Johnson: Lyndon must have expected the next two months would give him the spotlight as he used his great skill in guiding the Senate through the end of the session. Foreign affairs, however, are suddenly the center of things; Democrats, furthermore, are finally breaking away from his "be-kind-to-Eisenhower" formula.

Symington: No change. His stock-in-trade is having blurred edges and being available. Edges still blurred.

Kennedy: He has taken a responsible stand, disassociated himself from the Democratic Advisory Council's criticism of Eisenhower for having gone to the Summit and recommended continuing talks with Moscow if possible. The new emphasis on foreign affairs probably hurts him somewhat by recalling his youth.

The Real Thing?

★ Last week able Senator Warren Magnuson (D, Wash.) announced that next year his Commerce committee will investigate the regulatory agencies. So now, at last, we will get it. The headline-chasing House committee under Oren Harris has been random and erratic; Magnuson can, if he wants to, give us the real thing. Even so, the just concluded House inquiry showed the 15 million US consumers of natural gas almost unprotected by the Federal Power Commission; the one consumer-conscious commissioner William Connole, being fired; Eisenhower proposing an ex-FBI man to replace him; backdoor dickering between commissioners and oil and gas envoys accepted practice; orders of the Supreme Court thwarted or ignored; a case load constantly accumulating, and half a billion dollars of disputed rate increases actually being currently collected from American consumers who are almost helpless in getting FPC action.

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The President Explains

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The question on which the President's TV report to the nation has thrown some light and which the Congressional hearings may make clearer to the public is, as Walter Lippmann wrote last week, "whether . . . the country can have confidence that it is wisely and shrewdly and competently led." If the forthcoming campaign has any educational value, that is what the voters will be deciding in November, and the speech that Mr. Eisenhower read before the cameras on May 25 becomes, therefore, a basic document to which both parties and uneasy citizens will return in coming months.

Mr. Khrushchev knows, everyone knows, that little of importance can be negotiated until there is a new President. Each side acknowledges that diplomatic doors must not be slammed shut, but that now is not the moment to open them wider. The views of East and West have been stated and restated on the issues which were to be discussed at the Summit: Berlin, nuclear testing and disarmament. Neither side is likely soon to alter its position; likewise, neither side is anxious to force any new showdown and thus provoke a more alarming crisis. Each justifies its past actions; each waits for what time may bring.

The President's justification, as elaborated in his report, raises more questions than it answers. Thus, he confides that he had no "thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about. . . . Nor had our own policies changed." Yet he hoped to "make some progress in a Summit meeting?" Had he in mind an agreement to cease the testing of nuclear weapons, on which considerable progress had been made in Geneva? He does not say so, but if this was the negotiable issue, might it not be asked whether the Summit was the best place for ironing out remaining differences? Indeed, President de Gaulle's presence might have made progress toward a treaty more difficult.

"When there is even the slightest chance of strengthening peace, there can be no higher obligation than to pursue it." That is a statement of moral purpose, but it is not nit-picking to observe that there *is* a higher obligation. Because there is, there has been a Cold War. Peace could have been and can be assured any time this government is willing to do what the Russians want. If we assume that there is no higher obligation than the pursuit of peace, there is no reasonable explanation why the President invited a diplomatic rupture by permitting the continuance of the reconnaissance missions over Soviet territory. Or why, having approved a statement that "there was no authorization for such a flight" in Washington, he later assumed full

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responsibility, compounding the provocation.

It is hard to disagree with the proposition that the ferreting out of information about the military capacities of the Soviet Union is "indispensable to free world security" and that the "continuing gathering of intelligence information" is an "imperative necessity." But it remains to be shown why the Powers flight was an "imperative necessity." If it was not, why was it authorized two weeks before a Summit conference where the President hoped "to make some progress"? And if these flights remain an "imperative necessity" why have they been suspended? Perhaps because we now believe the Soviets can shoot them down. One doesn't know. Or perhaps the suspension was influenced by pressure from allies whose bases we have used. That is not known.

Sunday Night Alert

Moreover, it has not been explained why it was imperatively necessary for the Secretary of Defense to order – from Paris – the worldwide communications alert of US military forces on the night preceding the opening of the talks, and before it was absolutely certain that the Summit would cave in. Was it thought that Mr. Khrushchev – from Paris – was about to order a surprise attack? Or was it thought that this demonstration of military vigilance would influence the Russians to behave more moderately? If the latter, why was the order not made public immediately? Responsibility for that order was initially claimed by Secretary Gates. At what point did he consult the President? What considerations were discussed at the time?

Now, the President asks, why all this furor over a U-2 shot down "far inside Russia"? Mr. Khrushchev knew these flights have been going on for some years. He could have complained about them at Camp David. If he had complained, what would the President have replied? Would he have denied their existence? Would he have defended them as "vital" (he did that later)? Mr. Eisenhower must see a distinction between the way Americans would react to a charge that Russian planes had flown high over the US, and the shooting down of one of these planes over Iowa.

"The question," the President tells us, "was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date." When did that become the question? When the plane was shot down? No. That was known on May 5, and on May 9, Secretary Herter left the impression that the flights would continue. And the President at his press conference on May 11 left the same impression. But it is now said that the flights were cancelled on May 12. What happened in that 24 hours to persuade the President to abandon something which he had described as "essential"? And what is meant by saying the information the Powers flight evidently hoped to gain would be "unavailable at a later date"? Would it be unavailable to the "new techniques other than aircraft" [*i.e.*, reconnaissance satellites] which Mr. Eisenhower said "are constantly being developed"?

Most important of all, if "there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed," is the country not in great danger this very moment, for the nation is certainly not in any state of ready alert?

The President taxes our credulity further. The tale of the "weather plane" with the defective oxygen equipment was first put out "to protect the pilot, his mission and our intelligence processes at a time when the true facts were still undetermined." But the Administration knew at the time of the first Russian announcement on May 5, *before* the detailed fake cover story was released, that a plane had crossed the Soviet frontier on May 1, that in Mr. Khrushchev's words on May 5, it had "continued its flight into the interior of the Soviet land." We had been informed it had been shot down, and that, again in Mr. Khrushchev's words, "an expert commission is studying data that fell into our hands."

From this, surely Washington might have assumed that the pilot and at least some of his equipment had been captured. There is reason also to believe that the pilot was under instructions, if captured, to identify himself as a CIA agent, so as to make sure the Russians understood that the mission was not "military," and thus not "aggressive" in intent. If the pilot was dead, how did the cover story protect us – particularly since it was at variance with the weather story? If he was alive, how did it protect him, since he had been told to identify himself as an agent? What it certainly did not protect was the credibility of the United States. "It was issued," says the President, "on assumptions that were later proved incorrect." Could not what later was proved correct have been anticipated?

And if the President had "before leaving Washington" directed that "these U-2 flights be stopped," why was Mr. Khrushchev not informed of that decision as soon as it was made? Was the possibility not considered

NEXT WEEK: *The future in search of a candidate. Assessments of Johnson, Symington and Kennedy.*

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that the incident would be exploited to the full by the Russians in Paris? Might it not have been wise to find out before leaving Washington whether the President's belated decision to suspend future flights would be accepted by the Russians as sufficient apology or evidence of good faith? "It is apparent that the Soviets had decided even before the Soviet delegation left Moscow that my trip to the Soviet Union should be cancelled and that nothing constructive from their viewpoint would come out of the Summit conference." When was that apparent to the President? He left for Paris on the night of May 14. On the 11th, Mr. Khrushchev publicly said the President would not be welcome in the Soviet Union. On the 13th, the visit of the Soviet Air Chief to this country was cancelled and Soviet protests were sent to Norway, Pakistan and Turkey. Were there no last minute checks made by our State Department to determine whether what later was "apparent" to the President was equally apparent before his departure?

Mr. Eisenhower finds comfort in the fact that "Mr. Khrushchev did not go beyond an immediate objective – in this case the wrecking of the conference." But he has gone beyond that. He has backed the United States against a wall in the United Nations and elsewhere; he has led Ambassador Lodge to make this country look even more ridiculous by producing that "direct, fresh and authentic evidence" of Soviet espionage, which turns out to be a microphone in a seal placed in the US Embassy in Moscow in 1945; he has raked up old and new doubts throughout the world of America's competence, reliability and discretion.

The conduct of the French and the British the President finds "magnificent." What those allies would have done had Mr. Khrushchev not blown his horn so blatantly is an interesting question. They stuck by us, for they were and are stuck with us, but that is all. As for more distant allies – in Japan, in turbulent Turkey, in Pakistan – their attachment to the US will be put to more severe tests in the future.

Mr. Eisenhower's Conclusions

The conclusions which the President draws from his review of recent events are worth pondering. He asserts, for example, that "we must improve world conditions in which freedom can flourish, we must continue to move ahead with positive programs at home and abroad, in collaboration with free nations everywhere." Leave aside the ambiguity of the phrase "free nations" (Ghana, Pakistan, Portugal, Paraguay, Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Spain?); leave aside the relevance of collaboration with "free nations" to positive programs at home – what programs has the President in mind? Is he merely describing what is now being done, and does he believe that that is adequate?

And what sort of utopianism is it to claim that if



the United Nations were to undertake some form of aerial surveillance, "not only can all humanity be assured that they are safe from any attack from any quarter, but indeed the greatest tensions of all, the fear of war, would be removed from the world." The idea of a UN reconnaissance unit is admirable, but that it will prevent any attack from any quarter. . .!

The President hopes we will "keep up our strength" and guarantees that "our defenses are sound." Sound enough to accomplish what? To stamp out a "brushfire" war in the Middle East, off the shores of Formosa or in Korea with conventional weapons? There is great doubt of that, as many sober estimates of our conventional military capabilities – including air transport – have pointed out. Sound enough to win victory in a nuclear war, should one be triggered by design or accident? Not at all, for the President says that "in a nuclear war there can be no victors – only losers." And with that statement, he destroys the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. For if the Russians accept Mr. Eisenhower's flat assertion that the US could not possibly engage in any nuclear war without coming out a loser, of what need they be afraid, and what deterrent value is left in our powerful nuclear force?

The next several months need not be entirely wasted if the debate that has begun helps us understand what decisions affecting our security and foreign relations have been made, by whom, with what results and what changes in men and procedures are in order.

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Digging for Dirt

Anti-Kennedy Democrats are currently dissuading some bandwagon-minded friends from taking the jump by suggesting that the Massachusetts Senator may turn out to be a clay pigeon for "clean elections" snipers. West Virginia is a-buzz with alarms and rumors about corruption in the May 10 primary in which Kennedy defeated Humphrey. Mr. Nixon has sent a platoon of investigators into the state. The FBI is on the scene – and has been since soon after election day. But thus far there is no proof that vote-buying was responsible for Kennedy's victory; Kennedy forces are encouraging newsmen to get all the facts and publish them.

It is not news that elections are more frequently "bought" in West Virginia than in most states. Wherever there is abnormal poverty and illiteracy this is often the case. This year, however, there appear to have been more shenanigans than usual. And a "clean up" movement – of younger people, World War II veterans, school teachers – has formed to combat it. All this is grist for the Republican – state and national – mill. Gov. Cecil Underwood plans to make "Democratic corruption" a major issue in his reelection campaign this year, and West Virginia Republicans are happily preparing the issue as a present for Mr. Nixon if Senator Kennedy turns out to be the Democratic candidate.

No evidence has yet been provided implicating anyone in the "mass buying of votes" numerous West Virginians claim to have witnessed on election day. Indubitably there was "stop-Kennedy" money at large. Equally, the Kennedy organization contributed funds to the major county machines that stay in control through the judicious distribution of hard cash on election day. Perhaps – in fact almost certainly – those organizations used some of that money in the regular course of business. This may have contributed to the fact – if it is a fact – that this primary was, as the *Logan Banner* editor declares, "one of the most corrupt elections in county history." If total Kennedy expenditures were not the $70,000 the Senator unofficially estimates, but closer to the "more than $500,000" the *Charleston Daily Mail* figures, there was plenty of room for misappropriation of funds. And there is circumstantial evidence to delight a diligent district attorney: 44,000 of the 70,000 vote Kennedy majority came from 8 rural counties where local machines habitually turn out the vote for the "slate" they support, and Kennedy's name was a part of the "slate" in most of them.

Dozens of witnesses say they are prepared to give specific instances of invasion of the privacy of the ballot in this last election. "I watched at the polls from 8 in the morning until 3 in the afternoon," Republican Sam Hatfield told Scripps-Howard reporter Dickson Preston. "What I saw made me so sick I finally had to go home to bed. I saw numerous people being paid off . . ."

One woman voter – a housewife casting her first vote – wrote a letter to the *Logan Banner* enclosing $3 she said officials had pressed on her after casting her vote by operating the machine in her stead. "Buy the baby some candy," she said they told her.

"People were getting money and pieces of paper," a school teacher who was watching a Logan County precinct reports. "The pieces of paper apparently were slates of candidates for whom they were pledged to vote . . . It was an education to me. There I was with 'Vote for Gore' (a candidate for sheriff who ran third) cards, and there they were with stacks of $5 bills."

Mayor Clyde Freeman of Chapmanville, a Kennedy supporter in an area which Humphrey won by a wide margin, tells the story of one voter who asked for help in working the machine and discovered that his helper had cast his vote in the process: "How did that machine know which candidate I wanted to vote for?"

All this, however, does not prove that Kennedy or Humphrey or Lyndon Johnson corrupted West Virginia. It does illustrate the desirability of extending federal election laws to cover primaries, which are specifically exempted from the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, still the basic law on campaign expenditures. A sworn statement to what actually was spent in the May 10 primary might help in setting the record straight.

Tangling with Tammany

New York State has had its fair share of national leaders – Al Smith, Herbert Lehman, Averell Harriman and Franklin D. Roosevelt – but by and large Democratic Congressmen from New York City have posted a dreary record of mediocrity. In Washington, they are noted for working a Tuesday to Thursday week and then hastening back to their New York law offices and their political chores as district leaders. On roll-calls their attendance is notably low, their participation in significant debate is limited, and their leadership on matters important to their constituents is perfunctory. While Democratic Congressmen remained silent, Representative Lindsay, a Republican from a silk stocking district bordering the East River, demanded investigation of Title I housing scandals in which Tammany figures were deeply involved. Dr. Gallindez – the foe of Trujillo – was last seen at a Columbus Circle subway station, but it was Rep. Charles Porter of Oregon who led the successful fight for federal investigation of his mysterious disappearance. In the current Congressional argument over health insurance, no New York Democratic Congressman has been playing an active part, even though the city has an unusually high concentration of the elderly. All that can be said is that they vote right when they do vote.

Unfortunately, voting right is not enough. To influ-

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ence legislation, a Congressman must make a total commitment to the life and work of the House of Representatives. Why don't more New York Congressmen make this commitment? And why are the representatives of so talented a community so meagerly endowed?

Part of the answer is that life in the House is wearing, the take-home pay is not very much, the tenure is far from certain. Congressional service offers the able New York lawyer slight prestige compared either to outstanding success at the bar, or to the esteem in which Congressmen are held in other areas.

But the rest of the explanation relates to the manner in which Democratic Congressmen from New York City get their nominations. While it somewhat oversimplifies to say they are picked by Carmine de Sapio, the way to get the organization nod for the Democratic nomination is to play the organization game. To do so, a Congressional aspirant must become a local power in Tammany clubs which dot the city, six or seven to the Congressional district. Once in office he stays there by keeping on good terms with these regular Democratic organizations, which are in no sense representative of the people of the area. In every case what holds the clubs together is the legal and job patronage which Tammany dispenses. A man of independent views is unlikely to submit himself to a situation in which he answers not to his constituents but to a limited number of political clubs, run as closed corporations and dominated by the leader of Tammany Hall.

Machine domination of New York politics is not susceptible to ready reform, yet it is just possible that this year will mark the beginnings of a change. For the last five or six years, stirrings of revolt have led to the victory of democratically-organized groups over the Tammany clubs. This movement received a notable impetus after the disastrous Buffalo convention of 1958 in which de Sapio dictated the nomination of Frank Hogan for the US Senate. As a direct consequence, a number of eminent Democrats – including Herbert Lehman, Mrs. Roosevelt and Thomas K. Finletter – combined to organize the New York Committee for Democratic Voters, designed to reduce Tammany influence and nominate candidates of better quality. At the moment, the Committee is supporting more than 50 reform candidates all over the city for offices which range from Congressman, through State Senator and Assemblyman, to District Leader. The Committee's principal weapon has been the prestige of its organizers. In frequent rallies, luncheons and dinners, these eminent Democrats have offered their names and presence in support of all reform candidates.

The key race is a hotly-contested Congressional primary on the West Side of Manhattan between William Fitts Ryan and incumbent Congressman Ludwig Teller. Ryan is the most successful and the most appealing of the local leaders developed by the Manhattan reform movement. Teller, the owner of a liberal voting record, has otherwise failed to distinguish himself. Probably because he serves as a District Leader, teaches law, and practices law all at the same time, his absentee record is even worse than the city average.

European Economic Unity

At the current Geneva meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the US will be among those putting new pressure on Great Britain to fish or cut bait in her relations with the six countries that form the European Common Market.

The Common Market countries, through their ministerial council, recently decided to implement the recommendations of their joint staff for speeding up the fusion of their national markets. But they voted also to delay until January, 1961, the inauguration of changes in their external tariffs, in order to leave time for renewed effort to reach agreement with the so-called Outer Seven – the nations peripheral to the Six and led by Britain in the European Free Trade Association.

The recently-adjourned conference of the British Commonwealth nations had been regarded as an occasion at which a new, common attitude toward the Common Market might be developed, but preoccupation with the South African race issue confined the pronouncements of the conference to hopes that Europe, including Britain, would follow policies consistent with GATT and "avoid damage to the economies of the primary producing countries and those that are also developing exports of manufactured articles." An earlier suggestion expressed by Prime Minister Macmillan's first Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, that the Commonwealth as a whole might join the Common Market was not revived.

Thus, at the GATT meeting, the European Free Trade Association is up against the fact that the Common Market Six form the kind of compact economic association that is regarded as having a right to discriminate against non-members, but that the Seven lack the essentials for such recognition. Britain's original hope was the Six and the Seven might be grouped together in a loose organization; this opportunity vanished when it became clear that the Six intend to create a single economic unity among themselves, and that if the Six join the Free Trade Association, it will be as a single unit. Mutual tariff preferences arranged on such a basis, however, would meet strong resistance both from the US and from many of the Commonwealth countries.

The choice with which the present GATT conference is likely to present Britain, therefore, will be either to join the Common Market outright, with her partners in the Seven; or go all-out with the US and the Com-

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monwealth countries for freer trade in the non-Communist world as a whole and so put maximum pressure on the Six to keep their external tariffs at a minimum. The latter alternative would have support within the Six, at least from Germany and Holland, and also from the Common Market's staff members.

The Senate and Schools

Approval by the House of Representatives of a $1.3 billion program for school construction over four years represents a historic breakthrough. The question of federal aid to education – pure civil rights legislation aside – is the most bitterly contested issue before Congress, and this is the most general school measure the House has yet accepted.

The bill as passed does not permit states an option (as does the Senate bill) to use federal funds to boost teachers' salaries, and it does limit benefits to states complying with the Supreme Court desegregation decision – a modification of the old Powell Amendment. The alternative before the Senate now as in years past is: to agree to a bill limited to matching federal-state aid for school construction, which the President is likely to sign – or to risk losing any bill by refusing to accept the House measure, thus throwing the matter into a Senate-House conference committee. The joint committee might come up with a stronger bill but one which then probably would be bottled up by Rep. Howard Smith's Rules Committee.

Hold It, Harry

Harry, a piano-player himself, should have known better; yet it was he, of all people, who violated the rule of the old-time Western saloon and shot the pianist at the very moment he was doing his damnedest.

We refer, of course, to Mr. Truman's magazine article charging that Mr. Stevenson is indecisive. Written weeks, certainly, and perhaps months ago, it was published just when Mr. Stevenson was acting more decisively than any other man in the whole range of political leadership. He was so decisive, in fact, that he drew the fire of the massed Republican batteries, thitherto centered on Kennedy as the main target.

It is the second time Mr. Truman has made the same mistake. From the platform of the National Democratic Convention in 1956 he made public confession that he had thought Stevenson couldn't fight and had learned his mistake. Obviously, there is some definite failure of communication between the men, presumably a temperamental barrier that prevents a real meeting of the minds. To Truman, Stevenson does look indecisive. Undoubtedly, to Stevenson, Truman looks reckless.

Perhaps both are right and both wrong. Stevenson moves with a deliberation that maddens his more impatient friends; but there is truth in Thoreau's observation that "a good workman saunters to his task." Truman makes instant decisions; and there is much in the military axiom that it is better to do any intelligent thing in an emergency than to waste time seeking the ideal. Neither characteristic disqualifies a man for the Presidency; on the contrary, either may be an asset, depending upon circumstances.

What either man thinks of the other is not germane to the question the voter must answer in November. That question is, what kind of President is this country likely to need in the four years ahead – one who shoots from the hip, or one who draws a bead with the utmost care? Ideally, we need a man who can do both; but in an ideal world we might not need any President.

Water Down the Drain

With the national demand for water nearly doubling every 20 years – from 262 billion gallons daily in 1955 to an estimated 453 billion in 1975 – American cities are going to have to do something they've never done – purify and use their own waste waters. This is the gist of a report made to Sen. Robert F. Kerr's Select Senate Committee on National Water Resources, by Abel Wolman Associates, Baltimore water engineers.

More than 70 million Americans, out of 117 million having public water supplies, now drink water that has been through a sewage or industrial plant "at least once," the report says. But the present practice, it notes, is comparable to using a 2,000-ton freight train to carry just one one-ton load, and then discarding the train; for this is the proportion of liquids to solids in the ordinary effluent. Water can be made safe and fresh in several ways, none of them as expensive as freshening seawater, or even freshening heavily-brackish waters.

The Wolman report says, for example, that Los Angeles discharges about 450 million gallons daily into the Pacific, although freshening processes would provide water at less cost than that of the city's present supply from the Colorado River.

Many communities here and abroad devote a lot of expense and work to providing a safe effluent – but for someone else. They are thinking of getting rid of the pollutants, rather than in terms of recycling the water. A lot of sewage is used to grow crops. But the waste involved in that which still goes "down the river" is tremendous. The Wolman report says that activated sludges contain vitamins and no less than 12 amino-acids, beside enough protein to make them biologically as valuable as any good cereal. And the wasted effluent in the US yearly includes about 2.3 billion pounds of nitrogen and 600 million pounds of phosphorus.

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IN THE NEXT SIX TO EIGHT MONTHS

Temporary Reprieve for Berlin

Bonn

Khrushchev's about-face of May 20 – when he proposed what seemed to amount to a six to eight month breather – came as a complete surprise to almost everybody here. The East German regime was expecting a promise to convene a conference of the Warsaw Pact powers which would give the East German Republic its separate peace treaty. The faces of the Communist functionaries who heard Khrushchev's speech in Berlin were a study in surprise. The people of Berlin had expected a tightening of Communist pressure in order to force the Western Powers out of the city.

The representatives of the Western Powers, both in Berlin and Bonn, had again begun to worry about the tenuous lines of communication of the 11,000 soldiers of the Allied garrisons in West Berlin. These garrisons have all vital supplies needed for a one-year "siege," and the Western Powers would only have to mount an airlift of four planes a day in order to maintain the supplies indefinitely. Yet the sigh of relief which swept Berlin after Khrushchev's May 20 speech was heard in Allied offices and command posts, too. For interference on the Berlin *autobahn*, a deadlock in the four-power air-safety center in Berlin, and the mounting of even a miniature airlift could lead to an explosive situation.

While Mr. Khrushchev, speaking in East Berlin, has proposed a six to eight month "truce," he has not lost sight for one moment of his long-term objectives in Germany. These are the consolidation of the East German Republic by giving it a peace treaty, the creation of a "free city" of West Berlin and the "squeeze-out" of its Western garrisons, and the organization of the two-state "German Confederation" from which NATO forces would be excluded and which could gradually be brought into the Communist orbit. Khrushchev restated the first two of these objectives in his East Berlin speech; who can doubt that the other two are still integral parts of Soviet foreign policy?

It is also thought here that Berlin can continue to be used as a lever by Khrushchev. There is a strongly held theory, indeed, that Khrushchev is quite happy to leave the Berlin situation as it is. It is always a potential trump-card in a war of nerves, since the position of the Western Powers there is so obviously vulnerable. Why not leave the Western Powers, then, in the unpleasant awareness of their weakness? Moreover, the Berlin issue can still be used to stimulate differences between all the principal partners in the Western Alliance.

The third and probably most important reflection is that the desire to stimulate such differences may be the most obvious explanation for Khrushchev's apparently inconsistent behavior in Paris and East Berlin. For there was one common factor in his conduct in the two cities – he attacked the American and West German Governments violently, but pointedly made no adverse reference to either France or Britain. This reflection has animated the whole West German and West Berlin press in drawing one cardinal conclusion – that the Western Powers must stand absolutely united.

But the effort of Khrushchev to split the Western Alliance is likely to go on, and it is with this object in view that he has given himself a six to eight month interval in which to work. During that interval Soviet propaganda will accuse the American Government of putting the trademark "Made in Western Germany" on its foreign policy, will accuse Adenauer of deliberately holding up agreement on the German problem in order to arm to the teeth, will accuse Lord Mayor Willy Brandt in West Berlin of being a firebrand (Khrushchev made a play of words out of this theme in his May 20 speech).

Meanwhile, Khrushchev will continue to play his new part of "world elder-statesman" in which he made an impressive debut on May 20. During the reading of his hour-and-a-quarter long speech in German on that occasion, Khrushchev assumed a serious, infinitely wise and weighty expression – interposed his few extemporized remarks in the reasoned but stern accents of the statesman bearing the responsibilities of the world on his shoulders. It was a convincing piece of acting.

Adenauer is, rather naturally, convinced that recent events have proved him right in his constantly reiterated assertion that the Western Alliance would be subjected to a war of nerves, and that only unity and firmness would repel the Soviet challenge. In his own, smaller sphere, Herr Brandt is equally certain that the strong nerves of the Berliners and their complete calm have made their own, valuable contribution. It is not difficult to sympathize with both men, and it would be wrong to underrate the effects of their solidarity with the West. Yet the six to eight month interval which Khrushchev has granted should not be spent waiting for the next crisis. The West must work out constructive proposals to break the deadlock, and not retire to prepared positions which are patently vulnerable.

Terence Prittie

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Resuming Contact with the Russians

A meeting of prime ministers and heads of state ought to be the culmination of a successful diplomatic effort at lower levels. Only after the diplomats have reached substantial agreement through painstaking and patient negotiations does it make sense for the leaders to get together in order to approve what has been agreed upon and perhaps put a finishing touch here and there. What the diplomats were unable to achieve in the privacy of their offices, the leaders cannot be expected to bring about in the glaring light of publicity, surrounded by scores of advisers.

The apologists for the Administration now complain that nobody called attention to these principles of foreign policy before the Paris fiasco. But in truth, these principles have been stated time and again; they are nothing more than the condensed practical experience of mankind. The Administration has had ample warning from disinterested observers and from its own professional advisers – including John Foster Dulles on his death-bed.

Yet the Administration had to close its tenure of office with some kind of triumph. Thus it chose to use summitry not as the culmination of a successful foreign policy, but as an escape from, and a substitute for, it. Summit meetings thus conceived create the illusion of initiative in foreign policy where there is only the initiative to travel. They create the illusion of substantive action where there is nothing but the bodily movements of statesmen.

Not only are Summit meetings of this kind useless, but they can, as recent events have shown, even endanger the peace of the world. It is not by accident but expresses an objective necessity that for centuries heads of state, prime ministers and even foreign ministers have avoided too frequent contacts with each other and have dealt with each other through ambassadors. For the ambassador who irritates, deceives and thwarts a foreign minister is expendable. He can and generally will be replaced after a few years tour of duty in a particular capital; his government can wash its hands of his actions, and however obnoxious he may have made himself, the relations of the two countries do not need to suffer permanently. The situation is different when heads of state, prime ministers, and foreign ministers take over the functions of ambassadors. They represent their respective nations directly and they are not expendable. When they clash their nations clash through them, and their nations are insulted in their persons. Once this has happened, as it now has, the ill feeling between the heads of state increases international tensions.

The same disregard for the traditions of diplomacy, which are indispensable for peaceful and civilized international relations, characterizes the Administration's handling of the U-2 case. Nothing needs to be said about espionage as an accepted practice of governments. But something needs to be said in most emphatic fashion about the way governments caught in the act have traditionally conducted themselves. They have acted in one of five different ways. If there was a chance to get away with it, they have either denied everything or else said nothing at all. If there was no such chance but some doubt about the facts, they have promised to investigate and take their time in doing so. And when the spy was caught red-handed, they have either blamed subordinates or they have apologized for a mistake.

However, it is unheard of – and for good reason – for a head of state or foreign minister to take personal responsibility for espionage, to boast of its past performance, and to insist upon its continuation in the future. For by doing so, the head of state or foreign minister challenges openly and directly the security of the other nation, the ability of the other nation's government to provide for that security, and the very authority of the other nation's government in its own territory. Obviously, no self-respecting government will tolerate such a challenge.

There is on all counts an urgent need to return speedily and consistently to the time-honored processes of diplomatic negotiations. The Administration could do no greater service to the American people and the peoples of the world than to instruct our Ambassador in Moscow to seek an interview with Mr. Khrushchev at the earliest opportunity in order to make clear to him the Administration's true position with regard to a negotiated settlement of the Cold War, especially insofar as Berlin and the cessation of atomic tests are concerned. What Sir Winston Churchill said in the House of Commons on January 23, 1948, applies with increased force to our situation: "There are very grave dangers – that is all I am going to say today – in letting everything run on and pile up until something happens, and it passes, all of a sudden, out of your control.

"With all consideration of the facts, I believe it right to say today that the best chance of avoiding war is, in accord with the other Western democracies, to bring matters to a head with the Soviet Government, and, by formal diplomatic processes, with all their privacy and gravity, to arrive at a lasting settlement."

HANS J. MORGENTHAU

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Charles Burton Marshall

Missive Retaliation

Words are signals, and if they are to clarify rather than confuse, they ought to be sent up only after due deliberation. Hence this proposal for limiting diplomatic verbosity.

The "carrying on of foreign policy," President Eisenhower said in a press conference two years ago, "is a very intricate business, and it becomes, you might say, almost an art rather than any science." Pressed by a questioner, the President elaborated thus: "That is a very complicated thing. . . . This is so complicated that you have to go – you try to lay out a program, a plan, but it – work it if you have got it here, if you go here you have to defend from that, you have to move over here." Then he summed up: "It is a very difficult, intricate thing, and I don't care what head of state or government has been here or that I have gone to see has acknowledged the intricacies of today in manipulating what you might say the foreign plans of any free country."

The perceptive quality of the President's remarks has been borne out. They sound almost prophetic of Paris in the spring two years later. Yet, a bad diplomatic season may provide consolations – rewards to the spirit from bitter lessons learned. "We built a lot of character," once said a football coach addressing the alumni after a disappointing autumn. There is no reason why similar gains cannot be gleaned from a bad diplomatic spring.

The lessons emerging from all the intricacies, however, are likely to seem almost of copybook simplicity – matters so obvious and basic as to sound banal. Hearing them, one is likely to ask skeptically whether the conduct of sound policy requires nothing more recondite than homely truths. The answer is both no and yes. Clausewitz remarked of war that the most important things about it were simple but that the simple things were the most difficult. The same thing applies to the conduct of foreign policy. The apparent simplicity of the lessons is misleading – easy and quick to say and long and hard to do, as the convict said of the 30-year sentence the judge had imposed on him.

My own contribution to moralization in this trying time begins with the relation of policy to the words which are its vehicle and the actions on which it must focus. In an ultimate way all foreign policy must get down to action – to what a government will do and the conditions which will spur it. The crucial words in foreign policy are those conveying the pledge or warning of action. Yet in large portion the words of foreign policy are attitude words rather than action words, portraying disposition rather than resolve. The line between the two kinds of words is not precise. The implication of action may vary from zero to a top limit, where the word itself takes on the character of action.

The action words involve the faith, credit and prestige of the government using them. The attitude words are less critical. A good foreign policy man will always be alert to the action content of the words in any important text or draft – putting calipers on them, analyzing their meaning, trying to discern the substance to which they correspond. And woe to the government which gets careless in how it handles them and fails to distinguish between the components of attitude and action in its discourse!

For example, I recall an arduous argument during my time on the Policy Planning Staff over the word "intolerable" in a speech draft for the Secretary then in office. The context was to the effect that the United States would regard the prolongation of the Cold War as intolerable. This was an action word – adumbrating a decision to cease tolerating it. No decision to that effect had been made by President or Congress. No paper of that tenor had passed through the machinery of the National Security Council. The Secretary was insistently advised to strike it in favor of "onerous," "vexing," or some other term with less tendency to pledge the United States to a course it had not really decided on. The Secretary gave way finally with high reluctance for the audience was to be a veterans' convention, and "intolerable" would square better with the attitude they would admire. But this was foreign policy and not a popularity contest, and prudent and exacting subordinates managed to prevail for this one time.

Did a policy decision lie behind President Eisenhower's use of the word "abnormal" in application to the Berlin situation during the Khrushchev visit here last fall, or was it the adventitious result of an oozy mood under the spell of the Camp David spirit? Wheth-

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er employed carelessly or with design, it was surely a word charged with the implication of action, for what is abnormal is surely eligible to be normalized. I, for one, read it as a giveaway on an issue, and I am not surprised that others in far places did likewise.

What then of the word "vital" applied at Paris to justify the activity carried on by U-2 planes over Soviet territory? Here is perhaps the strongest term in diplomatic parlance. Vital is the established label for indispensable concerns, for things essential to a nation's life, for the things it will fight over rather than yield – as in the manner when governments reserve vital interests from treaty obligations. I do not see what other use the dictionary can justify. Yet were calipers put on that word? Was the gravity of the implication envisaged? Apparently not. What was asserted as vital on a Wednesday was declared dispensable on next Monday with retroactive effect to the preceding Thursday.

We must understand the relation of these considerations to national credibility and in turn the relation of credibility to security. These are not matters to be shrugged off as idle semantics. A government's credit in international affairs depends on the precision of the relationship between the action implicit in its terms and its actual intentions. When these are found not to correspond, the fact is registered in some degree on the minds in every foreign office with which the government deals. If this sort of thing develops into a tendency and approaches a habit, the harm becomes huge, for a government given a reputation for wanton handling of its action terms becomes bereft of the power to negotiate seriously. Its word suffers discounting in the international exchanges of diplomacy. The measure of a nation's influence in this world is in essential part the measure in which its word is taken seriously. When a nation is shorn of the power to have its word taken at face value it enters upon a dangerous course, for somewhere ahead lies a time when it becomes restricted to a choice between acceptance of historic defeat and resort to violence.

This fate has overtaken nations in the past. It is what happened to Napoleon III's France and to William II's Germany. No nation can afford to assume immunity. "Taint Necessarily So" is the last tune you can afford to have them whistling at you.

The matter affects the internal strength of nations as well. I thought of this repeatedly as I listened to the all but endless appeals for bovine unity in the aftermath to Paris – the urgings to rally around sheep-like, wool touching wool and the head down. The recurring phrase was to "stand behind. . . ." One does, of course. There is still a problem of how to do it with much affirmation – how to stand behind eschewal of a summit without promises of success and then accepting a summit with no prospect of success, behind the tag of abnormality on West Berlin and then the transfer of the tag to divided Germany, behind the vitalness and then the dispensability of overflights, behind Chiang unleashed and Chiang leashed, and so on. One does his best, but shifting at such speeds involves a peril of stripping mental gears.

"How do you stand behind a man who has St. Vitus dance?" the late Jim Watson asked on being urged to stand behind Herbert Hoover 30 years ago. It is still a good question.

The last moralization I have to offer stems from something said by the late Secretary of State Dulles in his salutatory to the American public: "I believe that our foreign policies . . . should be sufficiently decent and moral so that they will fit into your idea of what you think is right." I do not wish to dwell upon the hint there of a quantitative and utilitarian view of rightness. I am sure it was inadvertent. The implication that the people are bound to sit in judgment on the foreign policy conducted in their name and to apply moral considerations in the judging is sound. The first part of Stephen Decatur's famous toast – "may she always be right" – is just as important as what follows: "right or wrong, my country."

I doubt that many would disagree with that or that any except a few marginal experts in psychological warfare would dissent from a proposition of intellectual honesty as an essential element in the pattern of morality called for. I am sure we are almost all for it. My only point is that intellectual honesty is not just an inner affirmation of a warm wish to be right and to say and do the right thing. It is a function of intellect, entailing discipline, endeavor and energy.

It does not come easy in the times when communication goes on expanding in geometric proportion and adversary governments are tempted to use the facilities prodigiously just because they are there and the other fellow is going to use them anyway. It is awfully difficult – perhaps impossible – for governments to go on being newsworthy, accurate, and in focus with something worth saying day after day, month after month, year after year, in ever mounting utterance. There's where the rub is.

Besides all our concern with suspending nuclear tests and limiting and controlling armaments, why not consider a contract to limit words and put controls on the sheer verbosity of communication between governments? I would propose an agreement with the Russians for each side to confine itself to 1,000 words a month of open official communication, direct and indirect, to the other. The proposal would also entail closing down on unrehearsed answers at Presidential press conferences. That would be one of the main gains. Such rationing might restore us to leanness of prose and return meaning to our terms and abate the dangers of missive retaliation. Nothing will come of the idea, but I am not being facetious.

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WHAT SIZE PIE, WHAT KIND, HOW IS IT TO BE SLICED?

The demands of a rising American population for more consumer and community goods, plus growing demands of the underdeveloped areas for US economic assistance, make it certain that in the 1960's, a central national objective will be a more rapid increase in our rate of growth. But growth is not enough. There must be an allocation of wealth that serves the social and survival needs of the nation as well as the comfort of its citizens. Every possible candidate for the Presidency, Democrat and Republican, has paid his respects to "an expanding economy." Private reports and Congressional studies have stressed the importance of increasing output so as to meet the challenge of Communist competition. But how is it to be done? What kind of growth do we want? What are we prepared to pay for it? In the following pages, Professor Allen of the economics faculty of the University of California at Los Angeles and Edwin L. Dale, Jr., the New York Times' *economic reporter, open the discussion. Further comment on this issue will be published by* The New Republic *during the coming months.*

Thoughts on Economic Growth

The Full and Efficient Use of Resources

by William R. Allen

Other things the same, having more goods and services is better than having less. We can all agree that Utopia is fine – provided that each of us is free to make his own specifications of Utopia and how best to get there.

It is reasonable to hold that the *meaning* of growth is a persistent rise in real output – per capita. But the "per capita" qualification, while it is necessary, may not be sufficient: perhaps we should add also something about distribution. If, in a community of one million, the income of 999,999 people remains constant while that of one person increases, national income rises. Indeed, national income could rise while each of the individual incomes of the 999,999 falls. Is this to be deemed a "growing" economy? If not, then how many of the one million must have how big an increase in income in order for the economy to qualify as a "grower"?

How do we measure "growth"? It is convenient to concentrate on Gross National Product, for GNP data are available, and if the numbers (per capita) go up, we have growth.

This may be the best we can do, but it is not very good. There are technical deficiencies in the GNP estimates, and the difficulties of using the estimates increase as measurements are compared over substantial time periods. More basic, neither the meaning nor the measure of growth is adequately provided by aggregate GNP data, for while an increasing GNP is important, so is the composition of the product, its distribution among members of the community, the costs incurred to acquire it, and the framework of the whole organization of our society in which it is produced.

The road to maximum physical production is, in broad outline, quite apparent. (a) *Use all resources as much as possible.* With respect to the human factor, perhaps an 18-hour work-day, at least six days a week and 50 weeks per year, beginning at age five and continuing to the grave, seems about right. (b) *Use all resources as effectively as possible.* One appropriate policy in this connection is to provide powerful incentives for producers, both rewards for efficiency and penalties for inefficiency. (c) *Consume currently as little as possible,* in order to devote the greatest possible quantity of resources to capital formation, thereby making output tomorrow greater than that of today.

Faced with such a recipe, we may decide that growth is not everything. Perhaps intangible gains from additional leisure will be considered more valuable than

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losses in output from cutting the length of the work-year. Furthermore, the three ingredients of the recipe may not be wholly compatible. The prospect of working hard in the future is a present incentive, and the incentive may lose some force if the prospect is never realized. Again, the drastic and indefinitely prolonged curtailing of consumption seems scarcely the way to induce greatest effort. Finally, one may even wonder, as did Keynes shortly after World War I, about the philosophy of an unending passion for capital accumulation: if we save today, it is in order to consume more tomorrow – but does tomorrow ever come?

Problems of Choice

However, suppose that this country were to decide to accept the foregoing recipe for growth. Even then not all the necessary decisions have been made. In addition to choosing growth over a civilized work-year and also over a genteel level of current consumption, we may have to sacrifice other desirable goals. For example, it may be that some (perhaps otherwise undesired) income distributions are more conducive to growth than are others; although notions of "equity" may seem to dictate otherwise, the consumable portion of the social output should be showered on those who contribute most to our growth – no matter how agonizing to us may be the plight of the farmer and the tuna industry. Or consider the policy of foreign aid. It seems plausible that the giving to foreigners of domestically consumable and investable resources, however it may be defended in its own right, is more hurtful than helpful with respect to the encouragement of American growth. For that matter, few of the $41 billion spent directly on our military defenses contribute to capital equipment, and thereby to our future growth.

In these instances, and many others, there are possible conflicts between maximizing the real GNP growth rate and other desired objectives. We have problems of *choice*.

To continue another step, suppose that the choices have been made in favor of maximizing *this* year's GNP. After working all year like so many bees and beavers, we pause at midnight on December 31 to survey our handiwork. The GNP total is a big number, but what does it measure? Can we conclude that the bigger the GNP, the greater our military strength? Russia may still match us in missiles, satellites and foreign aid by devoting a relatively large proportion of a relatively small output to these selected ends. Can we be sure that the bigger the GNP, the greater our social welfare? What constitutes, or most contributes to, "social welfare" is a matter on which opinions differ. Your view and that of Professor Galbraith may not be the same as mine, in which case I shall not greatly appreciate decrees on the matter by you or by Professor Galbraith. Finally, can we be confident that maximizing this year's output is a sufficient condition for maximizing next year's? We may luxuriate now with a combination of high personal consumption, high communal consumption in such forms as elegant nursery schools and awesome submarines, and grandiose foreign aid. But what about capital accumulations?

We will not grow without *"adequate" saving and "appropriate" investment*. With that vital reservation in mind, the issue before us is whether the economy is currently producing the biggest possible bundle of consumer and producer goods and services of *the sort it desires* with the *resources it has available and chooses to employ*. But this – maximizing desired output with given resources – is the notion of *efficiency*. A good deal of confusion and arguing at cross purposes would be abated if the discussion of an expanding economy were couched in terms of (properly defined) efficiency instead of (ill-, or un-, defined) growth.

Whatever may be our particular pattern of growth – a pattern necessarily consisting of compromises among many alternative objectives – growth involves increased production. To achieve the greatest output with our limited resources, we must use them both *fully* and *efficiently*. Here the position of Keynes is valid: public measures may be required to maintain "full" employment, but within the achieved framework of full employment, "the classical medicine" of the free and impersonal price system should be allowed to do its work. Full employment, however appropriately defined, is not enough. A living standard which is high and rising as rapidly as we find it convenient to induce is to be achieved not simply by using all our resources, but by using all our resources well. Still, the first step is to see that the resources are used.

Money national income is equal to, and indeed consists of, spending on domestic output. If spending rises, money income rises. If money income rises, employment and output will rise – *if* there are idle resources to draw upon. The rise in output from, say, 1938 to 1943, was not caused weirdly by the exploding of bombs; it was caused by increased spending that made additional production profitable. But an increase in spending beyond some high level of resource utilization will increase prices and money income more than employment and output. If an indefinite increase in spending could ensure growth, we could raise our output without limit, for governments can create money without limit.

In the realm of theory, one can envisage an economy in which all output-prices and input-prices are sufficiently flexible and resources are sufficiently mobile that full employment will always prevail. In the realm of reality, we can confidently expect lapses from full employment, though there is no excuse for another Great Depression. Powerful monetary and fiscal tools – perhaps with preference for open market operations

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and for changes in taxation – are available for "stabilizing" the level of spending within limits.

It is not difficult to appreciate that resources must be fully employed in order to have the largest possible output. But less than appropriate attention is frequently given to the efficiency of resource use. Economic activity must be organized somehow. Various devices – including cultural mores and ethical norms, religious sanctions and constraints, and direction from centralized, coercive authority – have been used and advocated in the quest for economic order. But none has proved as efficacious and as congenial to a free and efficient society as arrangements under which individuals and business units can make their own market decisions, guided by market-determined prices, and spurred by the incentives of achieving market rewards and of avoiding market losses.

Growth means not only *increasing* output, but also *changing* output. Introducing new techniques and products, and discarding old ways and things, will inescapably involve changes in consumption and investment patterns and geographical and occupational shifts in productive activity. There will be costs to be borne as a concomitant of these changes and shifts, and the costs will be unequally spread over the community. Reject the incurring of these change-induced costs only if you are willing to reject growth.

Support of "ceilings" (*e.g.*, on government interest rates and on rents), "floors" (*e.g.*, on wages and on farm prices), tariffs and import quotas, "fair-trade" laws, monopolistic restraints on entry into businesses and professions, and so forth far into the night – in short, support of the curtailing of competition through restrictions, subsidies, discrimination, and the elimination of legitimate market alternatives – is, in bitter and ridiculous fact, support of waste. In a world characterized, since the days of the Garden of Eden, by scarcity, the way to growth is hardly through the subsidization of inefficiency.

Public versus Private Decisions

The forces of competition in the American economy are still potent. They must be hardy, indeed, to have survived so well the knowing and unknowing attacks on them. But those of us vitally concerned about the maintenance of both freedom and efficiency look with misgiving on the trend of affairs. The danger to the free economy lies not only in monopolistic concentration of business power (which calls for vigilance on the antitrust front), but even more importantly in the growing practice – through trade, producer, labor and agricultural blocs, often abetted rather than opposed by public authority – of resolving economic issues through political means.

Emphasis on the preservation of a flexible, innova-

More Business Failures!

If we want more rapid economic growth we have to sacrifice something. We do not, in my view, have to sacrifice price stability. What we do have to sacrifice is economic security for a considerable number of individuals. If our priority goal is the most rapid possible growth, we should do the following:

Avoid like the plague all depressed area bills. Let West Virginia die, in effect.

End the farm program and allow several hundred thousand marginal farmers to go broke.

Lower tariffs as rapidly as possible. Permit those industries that suffer to suffer.

Avoid all legislation designed to keep weak, small businesses in business.

Pass tough new laws barring all featherbedding by labor; permit the resulting loss of jobs to stand.

Be extremely wary of all proposals to "soften the impact" of automation.

All of these things together are necessary to raise our productivity faster than it is likely to rise. Barring a major depression, it is the rise in productivity that will determine our growth. Productivity suffers badly from farmers who shouldn't be farming, extra firemen on diesel engines, new plants seduced into uneconomic places because those places are "depressed," plants making watches or bicycles when foreigners can make them cheaper, a proliferation of small grocery stores instead of supermarkets.

Productivity gains when the people who were doing these uneconomic things go to work in electronics plants or become janitors in new office buildings. Maybe they have to move to California where the jobs are.

The point, of course, is that the key to growth is change. Change is the *sine qua non* of economic specialization and rising productivity. And change means pain for somebody. The harness makers suffered pain when autos came along, but we grew faster. If we "subsidize away" the price of growth in the form of economic insecurity, we shall get less growth. More pain, more growth.

Whether we *want* to sacrifice this much security to kick up our growth rate by another couple of percentage points is another matter. Such a plan would undoubtedly be for the greatest good of the greatest number, but it is still a pretty steep price in the age of the welfare state.

We shall probably get a somewhat higher growth rate in this decade anyway, simply because of a more rapid growth in the labor force. But if we want higher per capita growth – the only way we can all be better off in both private consumption and public services – a minority among us must suffer. The slogan for the growth promoter should be: More Business Failures!

EDWIN L. DALE, JR.

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tion-inducing, and price-directed economy is not tantamount to arguing for "small" government. True, Professor Hansen receives no support from me in asserting mysteriously that "the social utility of the marginal dollar spent by the federal government is far higher today than the social utility of the marginal dollar spent privately." But while I regret Hansen's admonishments to the public for its spending on "silly gadgets," I am little more favorably disposed toward the pretentious head-shaking of Senator Goldwater over all possible extensions of government spending.

There is no financial sense in the warning that the economy cannot "afford" better highways and schools, and it is entirely possible that strategic additional government investment – perhaps in subsidizing research and in facilitating mobility of resources – can supplement private investment in a manner to increase the social output. But a major word of caution is in order: make the decision of government expansion only in full awareness of the costs involved. While it is wrong to say that we cannot "afford" the roads and schools, it is nonsensical to say that we "need" them. To be sure, we *want* them. But we cannot have all of everything we want, so we must bear and compare costs in acquiring anything.

If the share of GNP accounted for by government is increased, then we suffer at least a relative curtailment of the segment over which private individuals have direct control. This is a cost, and its magnitude is enhanced by the looseness of control by the community over governmental use of resources. In selecting officeholders, the community gives only a general indication of what government is to do with the (currently more than) 25 percent of GNP controlled by government; and in the actual implementation of a chosen program, government administration only poorly approximates the efficiency of the market system. Furthermore, while in principle the remaining private sector of the economy can operate freely even as government expands, one may well wonder if the dividing line between private and public tends to disintegrate with growing government, with the consequent corrosion of the free price system.

How Much Inflation?

Another possible cost of growth is inflation. Growth calls for capital formation. In order to build bridges, machinery, and factories, resources must be diverted to these projects from current consumption. Consumption may be curtailed by saving and by taxes. But investors may also acquire some of their resources through the inflationary means of spending newly-created money.

Inflation may not be simply a possible *consequence* of growth – or of overly exuberant spending whether or not real output expands. It may be a cause of growth. The following line of thought is sometimes advanced: growth requires investment; (private) investment requires prospects of high future returns; future returns will be enhanced by a (limited) degree of inflation. The last step is the slippery one, and this case for inflation has not been proved.

But heroically suppose that some degree of inflation – and do not suppose that monetary tools are so precise that we can hold exactly and persistently to an annual rate of inflation of, say, 1.873 percent – is a necessary condition or an inevitable accompaniment of maximum increase in output. Then we would have a *choice* of (a) some inflation and maximum growth, and (b) no inflation and less growth. Even so, one might have some qualms in choosing (a). For how much inflation is "some," and how big is "maximum"? That is, how high is the price, who pays it, and just what is being purchased? For the given growth, is there no price in terms of inflation which is exorbitant?

Where has the foregoing discussion led us?

1. The bigger our pie today, the bigger the pieces we can devote to various purposes; but the size of the pie tomorrow will be determined in part by how today's pie is divided. Big slices for foreign aid, national defense, "welfare" programs, and even private consumption are not, in a fully employed economy, conducive to maximizing the size of tomorrow's pie.

2. Whatever growth pattern we choose, goods and services, not being manna from heaven, must be produced. In the light of resource-scarcity, the maximum quantity of desired output will be attained only by using resources both fully and efficiently.

3. There will be occasional fluctuations in the level of economic activity, but the intensity of the fluctuations can be substantially modified by appropriate general monetary and fiscal policies. Major depressions are unacceptable on all counts; unhappily, it is conceivable that appreciable inflation is a necessary condition of maximum growth – but it is not a sufficient condition.

4. Both individual freedom and economic efficiency are most likely to be attained under the operation of a free price system in a context of private property with persons essentially unfettered in the use of their resources but held accountable for the costs incurred as well as rewarded with the gains achieved. "Floors," "ceilings," subsidies and direct controls change (generally undesirably) the nature of the society we wish to preserve and also are wasteful of resources.

5. I conclude with two morals: The world is a complicated place, and beware of those too anxious to do good, those who tell us much of our "needs" but say little of costs; do not fret overly about trying to aid growth directly, putting the goose through the wringer in the attempt to squeeze out the golden eggs faster; rather, concentrate on maintaining full employment and free markets.

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Sokolsky, Meet Feiffer

by Susan M. Black

The Associated Television, Ltd., of Great Britain some time ago put on two television programs about the United States . . . the moderator of the the program . . . collected a most amazing group of Americans to discuss the subject. . . .

Alger Hiss was followed by Jules Feiffer of whom I unfortunately never heard. His comments I cannot interpret. They are of the new-fangled Beatnik type. . . .

It would be very interesting to know what this means. . . .

Whoever picked this gang did not know America.

George Sokolsky in his syndicated column, May 9, 1960

Dear Mr. Sokolsky:
May I present Mr. Jules Feiffer, who has lived in the Bronx (his birthplace), Manhattan (his transition period) and the US Army (his passive resistance period) – but never in Greenwich Village.

Sick, Sick, Sick; Passionella
The Explainers
by Jules Feiffer
(McGraw-Hill; $1.50, $1.75 and $1.50)

. . . Mr. Jules Feiffer who is a 31-year-old bachelor, the most talented social commentator in cartooning of our generation, and nearsighted – but not a card-carrying member of the Beat Generation. (He calls the Beatniks "A bunch of aimless infants who stand for nothing. They are a part of my target"). . . Mr. Jules Feiffer, people-watcher by profession, who hangs the people he watches with their own words – monthly in *Playboy* magazine, weekly in *The* (Greenwich) *Village Voice, The* (London) *Observer* and elsewhere around the United States in a now widely syndicated column. . . Mr. Jules Feiffer whose panels are collected and published in book form on what would seem to be an annual basis: There was *Sick, Sick, Sick* in 1958, *Passionella* last year and *The Explainers* last month.

Non-beat, widely-heard-of Mr. Jules Feiffer, then, who defies labeling.

Who when called "a satirist" retorts that satire is dead, reality having forced the satirist out of business: "What satirist in his right mind would dare dream up the present era of warmth towards our former enemies which suggests that the best way to get to love the Russians is to go to war with them, win the war and then feel guilty. We might then arm them with nuclear weapons to help protect us against Cuba. . . . Or a President who seems to begin every press conference with, 'Now I want to make this clear,' and who then proceeds to render the English language indecipherable."

Who when called a writer of "adult" cartoons replies that there is nothing adult about his cartoons at all and that he writes for children: "The questions I seek to raise are always questions a young, not very bright, child might ask. Questions like 'What is good and what is bad? Is good *always* good? Is bad *always* bad?' A child would answer 'Yes'. That's why I like to write for children. An adult, on the other hand, would recognize the innocence of the question and answer, 'Only sometimes. Good is good when *our* side does it. Good is bad when their side does it because they're just trying to lull us into false security. Bad is always bad when *they* do it. But bad is *good* when *we* do it because *they* forced it on us.' A child wouldn't understand that at all. Adults seem to."

But, let his cartoons speak for themselves. (Feiffer is very articulate; Feiffer doesn't need me to get laughs.)

Item: A bearded, berobed and besandaled gentleman announces: "Today's book is a rather bulky but promising first attempt by author or authors unknown. It's called *The Bible.* It is written in a narrative rather than introspective style which may perhaps make for quicker reading but leaves something to be desired on the level of character motivation. It purports to be a theological and historical document, and while this reviewer does not question its sincerity, he can only regret the publisher's failure to include a bibliography. But these are minor criticisms. One cannot deny the power and sweeping range of the subject matter – (one might even call it epic) – the subtle allegorical nuances touched at times with what seems to be an almost metaphysical insight! It will undoubtedly cause controversy in the literary field. But the authors while writing in a quasi-journalistic form show occasional flourishes of stylistic daring which makes one impatient to view their later efforts. I shall await their second book with great interest."

Item: A child (clutching ball and frowning) laments: "Eleven years old and I'm *never* picked for the team. Look at those *others.* They *always* play. Batting the ball . . . catching it. Running . . . laughing . . . (A silent scowl). There's something basically wrong there. Something *bad.* Something *unhealthy.* The way they *gather* together. The way they *choose* up sides. I'm very lucky they won't let me play. Otherwise I might not have noticed."

Item: While he is trying to kiss her goodnight at date's end, they think:

He: It's like she's made of ice.
She: Maul-Maul-Maul-
He: What does she think I am? From

Summer Schedule

During the summer months, *The New Republic* will not appear on the following dates:
July 4 August 1 August 22
September 5

Weekly publication will be resumed with the issue of September 12.

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outer space? I brushed my teeth before I came here.
She: *Flesh* – All I am is *flesh* to him!
He: She was affectionate enough in the Chinese restaurant. In a *mob* she's *always* affectionate.
She: He can be so nice when we're outside.
He: All the way up here I couldn't get her off my neck.
She: Outside I can squeeze his hand and bite his ear and he *never* gets the wrong idea.
He: But once we get *indoors* – suddenly it's – "You only recognize your *own* needs, Bernard."
She: Why does he *change* so? Do I somehow *threaten* him?
He: I know she's alive. I saw her lip curl.
She: If he just didn't put on those *damn flamenco* records.

And then they say:

He: Well it's late, Gladys. I better go.
She: As you like, Bernard.
He: Same time tomorrow?
She: Of course.

It must already be apparent that I've run into label trouble of my own just by calling Feiffer a cartoonist. He's not a cartoonist in the ordinary sense of the word but one only in the extraordinary sense he's given to it.

Ordinary cartoonists are story tellers; Feiffer has no stories to tell. He takes a human being (or two) and in a series of a few panels shows the thoughts going through their heads or the words passing between them. (He speaks of "writing" his cartoons because of the supremacy of the words over the drawings.) Nothing happens in his panels but talk and thought. His characters are full of words: words to explain away their actions, words that keep them out of action, words that invalidate that cliché about "actions speaking louder" as his characters blatantly reveal themselves. Feiffer's talkers and thinkers-out-loud include virtually everyone: parents, Madison Avenue types (advertising execs who have researched anger and found it marketable, others who have outlined campaigns to make the public *positive* fallout conscious; TV execs who decry the mediocrity of their medium and who will introduce quality slowly but surely, beginning with "*little* things. Quality station breaks. Quality time checks. Quality weather reports. Thirty seconds of quality *every* programming hour! . . . Once we get them to accept quality as being mediocre, we're *in*."); even politicians.

Feiffer's *personae gratae*, be they professional conformists or professional non-conformists, real Bohemians or pseudo, mental blockers, psychosomatic invalids, red-tapists or cockeyed optimists, have a great deal in common. They have not learned from their experiences but they've learned, instead, how to rationalize them. They know all the answers but have never found out what the questions were. They have an unrealistic picture of themselves which causes them to err in their choice of companions. Communication has broken down: all Feiffer's characters are monologuists or twin soliloquists.

Ordinary cartoonists are gagmen; Feiffer has no gags. The comedy lies in his careful documentation of the world of blah-blah. Says Feiffer, "If the soliloquists were aware at the end, it would cease being humor. The awareness should be on the part of the reader who will arrive at the last panel and discover something about the character through the character's own words that the character himself has no realization of." The range is from the hilariously funny to the painfully and frighteningly funny. It's easiest to laugh at the artist who is unhappy in his métier and who wishes that the world would make a place for shoe salesmen. It gets a little harder to laugh off the man who calls our current stage in the evolution of government *corruption*, with the "enlightened leadership" offering "a regular program of planned exposures to satisfy the public's appetite – a building inspector one month, a city official another – *anything* which will misdirect the gaze of an anti-corrupt citizenry. Thus the public is encouraged to think of corruption as an unwelcome stranger in its house rather than as the host." But the going is roughest when one comes to "Boom!", last of the four longer pieces in *Passionella*. It seems that each country is building bigger and better bombs and testing them. The skies are getting darker. (The people notice it but chorus, "I guess the government must have its sound reasons" and go about their business.) Disarmament conferences take place; each country is for peace "as soon as we catch up." More and more countries – and even some towns and private citizens – develop bombs so that attendance is on the increase at the continuing conferences. (The people hear the news and say, "That's the way the cookie crumbles" and "That's the way the onion peels" and go about their business.) When the skies are almost completely black the people chorus "Of course I'm concerned but what can one person do?" But while they go about their business the government hires a PR firm to put on a reassurance campaign; for a while all is well, but not, of course, for long. One day a man dreams up a bomb which he thinks will blow up the whole world. The "authorities," unwilling to take the blame for the test, take the question to the people who give it an overwhelming mandate, saying, "Now is no time to show lack of unity." So they have the test. And it works.

Cartoonist *extraordinaire* Mr. Jules Feiffer, then, whose panels do not always inspire laughter, but whose views of the Post-World-War-II American always reveal that he sees him exactly for what he has become: More and more white collar; more and more a suburban thinker if not a suburban dweller; more and more concerned with only his own. A citizen in a land which suddenly has world leadership, prosperity, nuclear power, stereophonic sound, small foreign cars and Fidel Castro thrust upon it. Too damn much is happening. He, who once was proud of his country's constant changing is now *dying* for a status quo. For no sooner can he adjust from an isolationist America to America as an international leader when he is faced, via Sputnik, Lunik and, God save us, even Beatnik, with the possibility of America as a second class power. So, he quits having opinions. After all, he could be wrong. So, losing his convictions he loses his need to care. He thinks more and more in terms of the system – payola – the fix is everywhere. And rather than feeling outraged by this he doesn't mind at all. Having been made to feel mediocre by a world too much for him to handle, he enjoys the exposure of mediocrity in his alleged betters. He smiles cynically. It's the system. "That's the way the ball bounces," he says. Possibly the most nonchalant statement of abject surrender ever phrased.

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The Return of the Chieftain

by James Chace

In *Salvation*, the third volume of de Gaulle's memoirs, the wily practitioner of *Realpolitik* and the mystical embodiment of a nation set out together on a crusade to restore France to the rank of a "great power." As the incarnation of France – a deeply-felt but nonetheless self-created mystique – he can and does ask "all men and women to support me, no matter what happens." The fascination for the reader lies less in his avowed mission, however, than in his techniques for accomplishing it.

Salvation
by Charles de Gaulle
(Simon and Shuster; $6)

Nowhere was Machiavellianism more necessary than in de Gaulle's dealings with his allies in the final months of the war. Excluded from Yalta and Potsdam, he knew the Big Three would try to ignore the demands of France in the final German settlement. Indeed, that there was a French zone of occupation at all was due in large part to de Gaulle's refusal to withdraw from any territory conquered by French troops, although those troops were totally dependent on British and American materiel and subject to British and American commanders. The French occupation of Stuttgart, which the General recounts, illustrates his methods. De Gaulle countermanded the orders of the Allied High Command which ordered the French Army to stay on the left bank of the Rhine. Instead, the French First Army under General de Lattre was ordered by de Gaulle to cross the river and capture Stuttgart, "which would give us an important pawn with which to further our designs as to a French occupation zone." After Stuttgart was taken, the American Commanding General demanded that the French evacuate the German city. De Gaulle refused, explaining that this was a political not a military matter and would have to be decided at a governmental level. Truman and Eisenhower vigorously objected; de Gaulle stood firm. The French remained in Stuttgart, evacuating it only after the boundaries of the occupation zone had been fixed.

Two other incidents dramatize de Gaulle's way of getting what he wanted. In December 1944, he visited the Soviet Union in order to conclude a Franco-Soviet mutual security pact. The question of Poland soon dominated the negotiations. The French provisional government had already established relations with the Polish non-Communist exile government in London; Stalin vehemently objected and insisted that the Communist-controlled "Lublin Committee" be recognized as the provisional government of Poland. So long as Stalin made French recognition of the "Lublin Committee" a prerequisite to the signing of a pact, negotiations foundered. The denouement came after a State dinner, almost Byzantine in atmosphere, with Stalin alternately toasting and threatening his victorious generals. Stalin and de Gaulle had retired to watch a Soviet propaganda film while French and Soviet Foreign Ministers Bidault and Molotov haggled over the details of the pact. At the end of the movie, de Gaulle summoned Bidault and told him that France would never recognize the "Lublin Committee" at this time and to break off negotiations. He then informed Stalin that his train would be leaving soon and that he was ready to depart without an accord. Stalin, uncomprehending, replied: "No, stay. We're going to show another film." De Gaulle, however, shook hands with the Soviet dictator and took his leave of Stalin's subordinates, "who seemed stupified" by his actions. A few hours later, his conditions were accepted.

The incident is symptomatic of the General's behavior whenever he dealt with "great powers." It was enough for him to proclaim France's greatness: by the alchemy of his words France was great, yet in dealing with his three principle allies he admitted that France was too poor to beg. Although of an aristocratic nature, he was unable to act out of the principle of *noblesse oblige*; instead, he haggled like a shopkeeper over tiny details. In his view, to accept anything less than he demanded was to accept an affront to France.

Yet no matter what the Americans, British or Russians thought France was entitled to, when de Gaulle retired in

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

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1946, France was one of the four occupying powers of Germany and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is almost impossible to believe that this would have happened without de Gaulle.

Fifteen years later, his basic ideas have not changed. After reading the memoirs, the Paris-Bonn "axis" seems less an accident of fate than a design, though de Gaulle was lucky to have an Adenauer to play the Mazarin to his Louis XIV. Visiting the defeated enemy in 1945, he predicted: "The cost of living and reconstruction would be for a long time the ambitions of the German nation and the aims of its policy . . . At the same time I believed I saw the possibilities for an *entente* which the past had never offered." De Gaulle also refers to a secret message sent to him by Himmler in the closing months of the war, in which the Nazi leader urged de Gaulle to proclaim an alliance with the defeated enemy, "since the Anglo-Saxons will treat you as a satellite." Although the General scorned this overture, he comments: "Flattery aside . . . there was doubtless some truth in what he outlined." A Franco-German *entente* leading a coalition of smaller European states might someday prove strong enough to act independently of either the Anglo-Saxons or the Russians.

In his attachment to Europe, however, de Gaulle shared none of Robert Schuman's or Paul-Henri Spaak's belief in a federated community under supranational authorities. Instead, he talks of an "association of Slavs, Germans, Gauls and Latins." His use of the ancient racial names is deliberate, for de Gaulle takes a cyclical view of history. The Soviet Union may be "tyrannical and victorious" at the moment, but their domination of Eastern Europe cannot last. Realizing that "nothing ever works out exactly as one would like," the General still conceived the rôle of France as the leader of the quarrelsome European peoples – a rôle which would be both "in her own interest and in the interest of mankind."

But something went wrong. True, he had restored France to a high rank among world powers, his conception of the future of Europe was in many ways more realistic than either Stalin's or Roosevelt's, yet in 1946 he resigned as head of the Republic he had saved from disgrace. Although he gives as his main reason for resigning his disgust with "the regime of political parties," a deeper cause was his unwillingness to identify France with the French people. De Gaulle never really recognized that the forces temporarily welded together during the Resistance were bound to split apart once a parliamentary regime was re-established. His second volume is entitled *Unity*, and to reconcile the irreconcilable was, above all, de Gaulle's immediate goal after the liberation. In this he failed. All of his great actions were in his own mind a response to the will of the people; once this will failed, de Gaulle had to retire until the will of the nation should again summon him.

Describing the state of France after his retreat, he refuses to admit that the elected deputies reflected the mood of their electors: "While the personnel of the regime euphorically took up their old habits, the French masses on the contrary sank back into sadness. With de Gaulle aside, that breath from the summit, that hope of success, those ambitions for France which sustained the soul of the nation, also disappeared. Everyone, no matter what his tendency, had, at bottom, the feeling that the General carried with him something primordial, permanent and necessary, which he incarnated through History and which the regime of the parties could not represent. In this chieftain who held himself apart, they continued to see the chosen recipient of sovereignty whom they could always turn to. One felt that this legitimacy was always there, though inactive during tranquil periods. But one knew that it would be imposed by the general will as soon as the country ran the risk of being once again torn apart and threatened."

His prediction was correct. In May 1958, a nation split by the Algerian war and menaced by a dissident army once again called him to power, and although the threat of a military *coup* was the springboard to power, the people and the parliament clearly revealed that the only recourse they had when the Republic was in danger was the General.

But the Algerian war shows no signs of ending. The question now is: are the French slowly becoming disaffected from their appointed savior? Last January when Algiers and the elements of the French Army menaced the State, de Gaulle quelled the revolt and seemed to have broken the back of the anti-republican forces. Hope for an Algerian settlement was higher than ever. A few weeks later, de Gaulle toured army bases in Algeria and spoke of a military victory as the only hope for peace, while repeating that his offer of self-determination for the Algerian Moslems was still open.

The Gaullist regime has to a large extent replaced actions with words. The use of propaganda on the government-owned radio and television networks, the seizure of newspapers printing articles hostile to the government have sapped the vigor of French democracy. The General himself has been pictured as a man who is not responsible for what his government does, while at the



Required Reading Before the Election

Viking Press has recently published William Costello's *The Facts About Nixon*, expanded from his articles which appeared in *The New Republic*. The 306-page book sells at retail for $3.95. However, it is available to *New Republic* readers at a 25 percent discount, or $2.95. You may place your order now. Simply send your name and address, with payment, to:

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same time the Prime Minister is stripped of any real power and serves more as a lackey of de Gaulle than as a parliamentary leader. For the moment, de Gaulle can probably continue to speak in ambiguities. But "to govern is to choose," as de Gaulle's former friend Pierre Mendes-France said. The General must choose for himself and for the world not only an abstract solution to the Algerian problem – self-determination – but means of implementing that solution. Is he willing to support a negotiated peace or does he intend to pursue a *guerre à outrance*? If the methods of Machiavelli begin to contradict the mysticism of Saint Joan, de Gaulle may be left as he was in 1940, "alone and deprived of everything, like a man on the shore of an ocean."

Yet, there is no alternative to de Gaulle at present. It is he who must cut out the cancer which is consuming French democracy. And then? And then what he must restore is not so much French *grandeur* as French democracy.

The Past for What It Was

by Gertrude Himmelfarb

Professor Michael Oakeshott once described the frame of mind exemplified by Miss Wedgwood: " 'History,' as I understand it, is the product of a temperament which delights in the past, and for which the detachment, the immobility, the deadness and the irrelevance of the past are not defects to be removed, but blessed virtue to be enjoyed." For a historian specializing in 17th Century England, this is a particularly noble attitude. It takes great strength of character to resist the theories and ideologies which most historians of the English Civil War read into it, to relate the chronicle of revolution, war and tyrannicide as it appeared to contemporaries then, rather than to colleagues now. Miss Wedgwood, interested in the past for what it was rather than for what it was to become, is engaged in a battle on two fronts: she is obliged to defend herself against the charge of superficiality, and at the same time to defend her period against the liberties that are so often taken with it. This collection of essays suggests her strategy on both fronts.

Truth and Opinion
by C. V. Wedgwood
(Macmillan; $4.50)

"Philosophy of history" is too grand a term to apply to the first essays in this book, embraced under the rubric "Art, Truth and History." What they are, rather, are reflections on philosophy of history, suggestive rather than systematic, intuitive and sometimes even inconsistent, but always seeking, even when inconsistent, to be true to her own practice as a historian. The title of the book is derived from a somewhat enigmatic remark of Sir Walter Raleigh: "It is not truth but opinion that can travel the world without a passport." Her effort is to suggest how the historian can hope to distinguish truth from opinion, to capture a sense of the past that is faithful to that past. At the risk of sounding old-fashioned and naïve, she defends narrative history against those sophisticates who prefer an analytic treatment of history. To answer adequately the question of "how," she insists, is to go far toward answering the question of "why." "Why" has the more probing, penetrating sound; but there is nothing more superficial and illusory than to try to deal with that question without first making the most careful study of "how." If we know how things happened, we also know, insofar as humans can ever know, why they happened.

What makes the "why" suspect is that the questions it poses are derived not from the particular event of the past but from our hindsight knowledge of what followed that event. It is all too tempting to regard history as retrospective politics – as the politics of the present transferred to the past. We seek the origins and causes of institutions as if this were the proper, indeed the only worthy, occupation of the historian. We try to relate events in analytic rather than "merely" chronological order, as if this were the only meaningful order. We try to determine the "necessary" and "significant" relations of facts, weeding out the accidental and insignificant. But this method is a violation of history because it is a violation of the past; it is motivated by a desire to assimilate the past into the present. Again, Michael Oakeshott puts the matter trenchantly:

> In the specifically "historical" attitude. . . . the past is *not* viewed in relation to the present, and is *not* treated as if it were the present. Everything that the evidence reveals or points to is recognized to have its proper place; nothing is excluded, nothing is regarded as "non-contributory." The place of an event is not determined by its relation to subsequent events. What is being sought here is neither a justification, nor a criticism nor an explanation of a subsequent or present condition of things. In history no man dies too soon or by "accident"; there are no

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Edited and introduced by Patricia Blake, these translations, by Max Hayward and George Reavey, of Mayakovsky's satirical play and numerous poems (with facing Russian text) have been awaited ever since Boris Pasternak renewed interest in Mayakovsky with his statement. "Here was that profound animation without which there is no originality, that infinity which opens out from any one point in life in any direction, without which poetry is only a misunderstanding."

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successes and no failures and no illegitimate children.

Miss Wedgwood provides an example from her own studies of how an understandable concern with the present can lead to a misunderstanding of the past. It has been one of the main occupations of English historians to trace back the development of the party system to the 17th Century, where the growth of two parties, Court and Country, Tory and Whig can clearly be demonstrated. But such a demonstration, she protests, while interesting for the light it throws on the present political situation, does not tell us "what was actually happening in Parliament at the time, what men thought was happening, and what elements in the situation they themselves recognized and valued."

The idea that there were two sides in Parliament was then regarded as dangerous and subversive, not only by the king but by Parliament itself. The members of the House of Commons could see that there were in fact two sides, but they did not give credence to it; they denied the fact by proclaiming their own faction to be the only true party in the Commonweal, the only legitimate House of Commons. Thus the perspective of the present, the knowledge of hindsight, is very different from the perspective of the event itself. As Miss Wedgwood says, giving its due to the present as much as to the past:

> It is easier to understand the ultimate development of Parliamentary government in England by tracing the party system to its origins; but we shall understand the Civil War and the Long Parliament better if we realize, not merely objectively, as a quaint oddity, but with full intellectual sympathy, how repugnant this idea of a divided Parliament was to the men of the time.

Miss Wedgwood's major works on the English Civil War are the exemplification and vindication of her theories. The vignettes included in the second part of the present collection of essays – notably those on the last masque performed for Charles I and on the varying fates of the "common man" during the Civil War – demonstrates how a respect for the past can be combined with resourcefulness and imagination.

Art and the Merely Arty

Satyajit Ray, the Indian director, has now completed his film trilogy whose first two parts were *Pather Panchali* and *Aparajito*. The third film, *The World of Apu*, is a considerable departure in tone from the preceding two.

Without a knowledge of the novel by Bannerji (called *Aparajito*) on which the whole work is based, it is impossible to say whether this departure is the novelist's or Ray's. But the break is sharp.

The World of Apu
(Harrison)

Pull My Daisy
(G-String Productions)

Pather Panchali was the chronicle of a poor Bengali couple and their children; in the second film we watched the son of the family progress through school days to college, and the picture closed with him flapping his big feet down the dusty road to the city, leaving the village (and a traditional life) behind.

Both these films, despite their technical and other shortcomings, were remarkable for their revelations about Indian life, their gentle, unsophisticated poetry, and especially for the sense – unstrained yet inescapable – that this was a national epic. It was, in that regard, a classical work: the characters were all individuals; still, they were telling us a story larger than their own.

The World of Apu is, by that standard, a highly romantic work; its range is narrower – one man's life. It tells of Apu's marriage (in peculiar circumstances), of his falling in love with his wife subsequently, of her death in childbirth, of his *Wanderjahre* in search of soul's peace, and his reconciliation with his son. It has some of the defects of the previous films and many of the virtues; but it has none of the quality of a national epic. Apu is now Apu, nothing more. His story is effective in so far as it strikes personal responses, but the story of India or of today's Bengali is not being told through him.

This necessarily diminishes the film, but it need not have diminished it quite so much if the romantic story had maintained more of a grip in its own terms. The circumstances of the marriage we can accept as a part of Indian life – though how unusual I can't say. (He is a guest at a wedding. Just before the ceremony the bridegroom is discovered to be insane. Apu is implored to replace the groom even though he doesn't know the girl; if not, by custom, she will never be able to marry.) But the sorrows of this Bengali Werther, his wanderings after her death with a staff and sprouting beard, his failure to recover from an emotional wound in the best self-dramatizing style, with much striding across fields into the sunset – these things are divisive between us and the work.

So it cannot be said that the trilogy is sustained satisfactorily to its conclusion. Yet the fact that the last film turns sentimental should not make us lose perspective on the whole work. (Bernard Shaw notes that in the last scene of *Siegfried*, Wagner's *Ring* ceases to be music-drama and becomes opera; but we haven't discarded the tetralogy because of that.) Ray has accomplished a work which, although notably uneven, puts him among foremost contemporary directors by reason of a general purity of vision, devotion, and sheer will to use the film for large pertinences.

A Beat film has come along, narrated by Jack Kerouac, called *Pull My Daisy*, which might more appropriately be called *Pull My Leg*. For as an insight into the Beat world, it is unhelpful; the poets and painters in it look no different from all American bohemians – over-

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

James Chace *has spent many years in France, as a soldier and also as a student at the University of Paris.* Gertrude Himmelfarb's *newest book is* Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution.

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weeningly proud of not being rich and successful, trembling constantly in the fear that their talents will bring them money and bathtubs and an orderly cleanliness that their suppressed bourgeois streaks will be unable to resist. And as satire, the film is mildewed Sinclair Lewis; so far as it has a subject, it seems to be kidding conventional religion and patriotism.

What is interesting about it is that in lighting, movement, even in cutting, it suggests – possibly accidentally – old silent-film comedy. It is as if some film clips had been unearthed from a Fort Lee, N. J., studio vault, had been patched together moderately logically with the hint of surrealism that is a hallmark of much early film comedy, and had then been provided with a somewhat da-da commentary humorously syncopated to the action. It is short (30 minutes) and will disappoint you only if you expect a daring avant-garde film or a strong statement of rebellion. STANLEY KAUFFMANN

Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subject of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

The U-2 Incident

Sirs:

The views and observations of Mr. St. Onge (*NR*, May 23) are, I think, far more widespread than he might think. In discussing the Summit failure with my women friends I have discovered that they are all united, Democrats and Republicans, in the conviction that President Eisenhower has blundered us into this mess. I've heard four dyed-in-the-wool Republicans in my neighborhood say in the past two days, "Adlai Stevenson is the only man in America who can get us out of this mess.

I've no doubt that we would be fully mobilized, if not already dropping bombs, if the Soviet Union sent a jet over Kansas, bragged about it when it was shot down, practiced war games off the coast of Florida, announced their intention to resume weapons testing and to make it national policy to send their aircraft capable of dropping atomic bombs over our cities.

Far from appeals to unity, we should be hearing some demands that the President be impeached for his violation of International Law and his blundering irresponsibility during the past two weeks. *Mary Mostert Grooms*
Rochester, New York

Sirs:

Let me second Mr. St. Onge's thoughts on the U-2 incident. We enjoy telling ourselves that we are the palace guard of honor and justice, and we carry this obsession to the point of self-delusion. However, when for some reason this complacency is shattered and our claim to saintliness becomes untenable, we smoothly revert to a hardened pragmatism. We are capable, evidently without a single qualm, of shrugging our shoulders and saying "so what, if we were violating international law, it had to be done." . . . Right is, in the last analysis, what we make it. I feel as uncomfortable about this attitude as does Mr. St. Onge. When he notes the near unanimity with which politicians and other public figures backed the US action in deliberately violating Soviet air-space, he hears echoes of the days of manifest destiny. So do I, and I can't help thinking that the cultural immaturity that this country displayed in the nineties has not yet been outgrown.

Roger M. Leed
Harvard College

What Would Kennedy Bring?

Sirs:

I read with disappointment the comments in the T.R.B. column about Kennedy (*NR*, May 23). If the writer believes that Kennedy "would bring ability and an appreciation of top-rate advisors to the White House," should he really be concerned whether "he [Kennedy] would also bring passion and power?"

Richard La Brecque
Cambridge, Massachusetts

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